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Ethical Limitations on Sociological
Reporting

Joseph H. Fichter
Loyola University
William L.Kolb
Tulane University
In his primary task as the discoverer of new knowledge, the modern scientist is governed by the obligations to search for truth, to be objective, to discern
the relevant, to check meticulously his data, and, in some circles, to accept
responsibility for the use to which his knowledge is put. This ethical code,
however, fails to cover the problems arising from the relations between the
scientist and the objects of his observation and experimentation. This may be
due in part to the very conceptualization of phenomena as "objects." Only
"subjects" have rights which must be respected.
There is evidence, of course, that social scientists are vaguely aware that
they incur responsibilities which extend beyond the procedural ethics of science
itself: that men are subjects as well as objects and that even when studied as
objects they retain certain of their rights to privacy and respect. Thus the experiments on living human bodies of prisoners, made by Nazi doctors, gained them
infamy rather than fame. The theoretical literature of American psychiatry hides
the identity of most of its patients. And sociologists and anthropologists frequently attempt to disguise the communities they study.
The lack of consensus in this area of responsibility attests to the fact that
the norms underlying such efforts to respect people who are studied have never
been systematically formulated as part of the procedure of scientific research
and reporting. Indeed individuals and groups receive the greatest protection
when scientific research is linked with the doctor-patient relation as in the case
of psychiatry. In other areas protection seems to depend upon a diffuse and
uncertain feeling of respect for the human "object." This protection is
Reprinted from American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 5, October, 1953, pp. 544–550.
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adequate, however, only where it does not interfere seriously with the gathering
and reporting of data or where its violation would take such extreme form as to
severely shock both the scientist and his society.
Under present conditions, the possibility of disturbance and shock seems
greatest where research and reporting directly involve identifiable small groups
and individuals. Research workers also seem to be effectively barred from
experimentation which threaten the physical wholeness of the individual. Beyond these areas of investigation every research worker seems to be largely on
his own in determining what research shall be conducted and what report shall
be made so far as the impact of the research and the report on the objects of the
study are concerned.
In this state of normlessness even the individual and the small group can
be threatened if the possibility of identification is only indirect or if the violation
of rights is not obvious and flagrant. Thus men may not be plunged into freezing
water involuntarily, but children have been placed in authoritarian situations to
discover the effects on their attitudes and behavior. Sexual relations between
husband and wife cannot be observed by the family sociologist, but other forms
of private behavior have been observed and reported. The psychiatrist will guard
the identity of his patient, but the student of a community may report behavior
on the part of an individual who can be indirectly identified by other members
of the community or by other people in the larger society.
Although the psychologist and the social psychologist face ethical problems
in experimenting with human beings, the sociologist seems most vulnerable in
his studies of small groups and communities. His problem, since he does not
often experiment, seems to be the question of whether there are ethical limitations on the "complete" objectivity of a research report concerning such groups
and communities, for it is in this area of research that there are signs that the
ethical sense of the sociologist is either dormant or only intermittently and
uncertainly active. An explicit code of ethics which will govern the social
scientist in reporting such data seems urgently needed.
In attempting to develop a system of relational ethics the sociologist must
remember that while the people he studies have rights, these rights cannot be
secured by an unqualified assertion of the "subject" status of his objects of
investigation. It is an obvious absurdity to assert that these "subjects" are
entitled to absolute anonymity, privacy, and protection, for in various circumstances the sociologist may be obligated to describe in full detail the actions of
identifiable groups and individuals. Moreover the development of a code of
ethics will not relieve the sociologist of moral choice, but can serve only as a
guide for the making of decisions for which he must accept responsibility.
Having said all this, however, it remains true that sociologists need to formulate
a system of ethical norms to protect the objects of sociological reporting. It
is as a tentative statement of the conditions relevant to such norms and of a
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few of the most important norms themselves that the following discussion is
offered.
Before presenting our conception of some of the important normative variables in the formulation of such a system of ethics, it is necessary to consider
first the matrix of conditions into which the system must be placed. Two aspects
of this matrix seem particularly important. The first of these has to do with the
various groups of people to whom the reporting sociologist has obligations; the
objects of the study are only one such group. The second aspect concerns the
fact that even in community and small group studies certain kinds of data and
certain modes of data presentation pose the ethical problem in its most intense
form, while other data and modes of presentation offer only minor problems. It
is necessary to distinguish these factors, since, as scientists, maximum freedom
is desirable and hence no needless restrictions are in order.
In preparing a research report on a small community or group the sociologist has a moral duty toward several different groups. Because his obligations
to each of these differ in kind and degree while at the same time they condition
and limit one another, it seems necessary to set forth briefly the categories into
which they fall.
1. For practical, as well as moral reasons, the sociologist must consider the
wishes and needs of those persons who have allowed, invited, sponsored, or
cooperated with the study. Management of a factory group, officers of a labor
union, ministers, and city officials, are all examples of people who may have
some concern for the results of sponsored research. The sociologist's obligations
to such persons are truthfulless, the honoring of confidences, scientific objectivity, and honest reporting.
2. The sociologist has obligations to the source from which research funds
were obtained. Like anyone who enters a contractual agreement, he has the
ordinary obligations to employ these funds honestly and usefully, and to abide
by the terms of the agreement concerning publication and ownership of data,
and by any other explicit provisions which might have been incorporated in the
contract.
3. The publisher of the research report has a call upon the moral consideration of the sociologist. Again the obligations are derived from the ordinary
desirability of honesty and thoroughness, or from legal rights relating to libel
suits and other embarrassments in which the report may involve the publisher.
4. Social scientists in general may be said to have a claim on the findings
of the social researcher. The scientist's colleagues have a moral expectation
that the findings will be made available to them in a serious, honest, and
competent report. In addition to these expectations which do not differ much
from expectations of professionals in other areas of work, there are the specifically scientific demands for a free exchange of data and knowledge unhindered
by secrecy and suppression.
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5. Another kind of group has a similar claim, perhaps not on the individual
scientist but certainly on the discipline, to receive the findings of social research. In the long run this group is the society itself, for it is particularly
important that social science knowledge ultimately become the possession of all
the people. If there are reasons for the holding back of research findings from
the general public for a short time, this group will still contain, at a minimum
estimate, the key persons in a community or group who are in a position to
utilize the research findings in programs of social improvement. The sociologist
himself must bear the responsibility for determining who these persons are,
unless they are defined by legal norms of the community of which the social
scientist himself is a member.
6. Against the claims of all these groups on the findings of the sociologist,
there exist the rights of the community studied, its subgroups, and its individual
members. Their rights to secrecy, privacy, reputation, and respect, will vary
according to circumstances and to the demands of the other groups, but they are
intrinsically present—a society like our own which in its central tradition accords dignity and worth to the individual. The sociologist has not discharged his
duties when he has met his obligations to sponsors, fund sources, publisher,
social scientists, and the general public; nor has he completely discharged them
when he makes a perfunctory effort at disguise, ambiguity, or anonymity. He
is always faced with the moral problem of how much to tell about the lives and
habits of the members of the community or small group.
The problem varies in its intensity, however, with the kind of data and with
the mode of presentation. It seems obvious that historical material allows more
latitude for reporting than contemporary material. Every study of a small group
or community seems to require a brief sketch of historical background, and
through this research the scientist may discover certain skeletons in the closet.
Their revelation may be pertinent to the understanding of the group and will
probably not intrude too greatly upon the community's or its individuals' reputations.
Within the area of contemporary material a distinction can be drawn between studies of primitive societies and civilized communities. It is supposed
that the details of social life among the Samoans were not reported to these
people, and if any reputations suffered from such study it was only among
non-Samoans. There have been instances, however, of anthropologists' reports
getting back to American Indian tribes, causing some dissension and suspicion
among the members of the tribe. In either case the sociologist must consider
these people as the subjects of human rights, even though the prospect of moral
damage may not be great.
In studying contemporary communities the problem of reporting varies
according to whether the data concerned are sacred or non-sacred. The analysis
of behavior patterns which involve high traditional values (like religion, family
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and sex, ethnic and group loyalties) should, of course, be as objective as possible, but an effort should be made to avoid needless and callous affront to the
people who hold such values and such an effort requires special attention and
care. In non-sacred areas (such as economic and political activities, housing and
recreational problems) there can be greater freedom of reporting.
A related and equally important distinction must be made between public
and private facts. This is something more than the difference between hidden
and open knowledge. By definition, the sociologist deals with social and group
relations. Hence, in a sense, his data can rarely concern completely private and
secret activities. Nevertheless it is obvious that widely-known facts allow a
much wider margin of expression in the research report.
The manner of presenting the data may be equally important as the kind of
data presented in increasing or lowering the intensity of the moral problem of
what to report in a community or small group study. Although the custom of
sociologists of providing anonymity to the community, group, or individual is
not an adequate safeguard of the rights of these subjects, it does make possible
a wider margin of expression than would a complete and open identification.
There are, however, other and more important differences of mode of presentation.
The happiest situation for the social scientist is one in which statistical
analysis of, and reporting on, the actions and characteristics of people is possible. Where large numbers of people are involved it is obvious that the problem
of ethical limitations on the report hardly exists. But even in communities where
situations are revealed that may be somewhat distasteful, the sub-groups and the
individual may be adequately protected by the use of statistical categories.
As soon as the sociologist leaves the field of quantitative analysis and
attempts to describe in conceptual terms the social relations in a small group or
community, the problem of what to report becomes much greater. Even when
the community is cloaked in anonymity, indirect identification is almost always
possible, and there is likely to be a subtle and unintended violation of human
rights. The threat becomes even greater when the sociologist adds to his description of the social relations in the group or community an interpretation of the
motivation which supports these relations and other social behavior. Thus,
where systematic sociological description and interpretation of motivation combine, the sociologist faces the gravest moral challenge, and particularly so where
this mode of description and analysis is applied to a leading member of the
group. The likelihood that such a person will be identified and his social behavior and personal reputation placed under scrutiny by his fellows on the basis of
the research report is very great. Here, more than anywhere else, the sociologist
must take care not to needlessly injure another human being.
The problem of truth telling thus becomes a circumstantial one. This means
that while telling the truth cannot per se be wrong or harmful, the ethical
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question of whether or not to include a certain objective fact always arises in
relation to person and circumstances. Thus complete objectivity, or telling all
the truth in all circumstances, is not necessarily a morally good act.
This is true for several reasons. The researcher is, of course, bound to
secrecy where information has been given in confidence or where he has made
promises of secrecy. At the same time, as a scientist, he will discover natural
secrets, which by their seriousness demand silence on the part of the reporter.
There is also the problem of detraction—the injury of another's reputation by
revealing what is detrimental but true about him. If the harmful fact is already
widely disseminated or if the subject is mistaken in the belief that the fact will
result in the impairment of his reputation, the sociologist may not have any
obligation to conceal the fact. Otherwise its revelation is a serious matter.
In summary, it can be said the problem appears in its most intense form
when some member of a community or group is singled out for description and
analysis and where such description and analysis may result in the revealing of
secrets, the violation of privacy, or the detraction of reputation. Placed in this
situation the sociologist must evaluate the claims of the individual, or of the
sub-group and community, in their relations with the claims of the research
sponsors, the donors of funds, the publisher of the report, the expectations of
colleagues, and the rights of the larger society. We suggest that if the researcher
accepts the values of human dignity and worth and does not want needlessly to
injure the objects of his investigation, he will take the following four variables
into account in attempting to arrive at a decision.
1. The sociologist's definition of the nature of science. Some positivists
seem to regard science only as a fascinating game played according to a set of
rules.* It is doubtful that the sociologist using this conception of science may
ever legitimately overrule the rights of the people studied. The simple wish of
the people to conceal certain aspects of their behavior must then be considered
sufficient to bar the report of that behavior.
If one regards science as a search for truth as an end to itself, the demands
of the objectivity of science will carry much weight in the decision to publish
all pertinent data. Except in history, however, the truth for which the social
scientist searches is nomothetic, not idiographic, truth. It may be necessary to
base generalizations on certain idiographic items, but man has the entire span
of his career on earth to discover and disclose such items. Certainly a particular
item of current behavior turned up in a community study need not be used to
support a generalization if such use inflicts injury on the people being
investigated.
* "Science after all is one of the games played by the children of this world, and it may very
well be that those who prefer other games are in their generation wiser." Carroll C. Pratt, The Logic
of Modern Psychology, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939, p.57.
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There is a third conception of pure science. Social scientists may believe
that science is both a rigidly ruled game and a search for truth which is valuable
for itself, but they usually also believe that science well developed and used by
experts or disseminated among the people can make for a better life. There is a
sense of urgency about accomplishing this mission of pure science in the modern
world. Thus, within this perspective, considerable pressure arises to ignore the
rights of people who are scientifically studied. Despite this pressure it remains
true that a wilful disregard for the rights of persons and groups to their privacy,
reputations, and secrets, will tend to destroy the very values which the scientist
hopes his basic research can render more achievable.
Frequently the scientist makes a community or small group study not as a
pure scientist but in one sense or another as an applied scientist. He may carry
on the research for what he himself considers desirable practical ends; he may
be employed by officials of the community or group or by those of the larger
society; or he may be employed by some private group with a specific selfish
or altruistic interest. In all three of these instances there is pressure to report all
the significant findings even though injury may be done to the objects of the
study. Nevertheless the sociologist must abide by the rule that he exercise every
effort to determine whether or not the values to be implemented by the study,
and the probability of being able to achieve them through the use of its findings,
justify the harm done to the members of the community or group.
Preoccupation with applied science is frequently accompanied by the temptation to look for and publish data which will further the realization of what the
researcher himself regards as the good society or community. He is likely to
believe that all of his data must be revealed in all circumstances. It appears to
us that a scientist of this persuasion is most in need of the virtues of tolerance,
compassion, and love, because he is in danger of placing the considerations of
the "good" society above all consideration of individual rights and injuries.
The hired scientist, moreover, cannot avoid responsibility for revealing data
injurious to individuals and groups by pleading loyalty to community or nation
or by indicating his contractual responsibilities to a private group. Loyalty to
community or nation may require injury to individuals and groups, but in such
cases the scientist shares whatever guilt is incurred with all other responsible
agencies. In instances of purely contractual research the scientist must accept
full responsibility, because loyalty to nation or community is not involved. He
is free to refuse the job, and if the values of the employing group are wrong or
do not justify the amount of injury done the scientist must accept the moral
responsibility.
2. Determination of the extent to which a person or group will be injured
by the publication of data concerning their behavior. Those instances in which
the scientist can foretell with certitude that serious injury will be done to the
objects of his study seem to be very few in number. It is also likely that the
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largest proportion of his data will be free of possibly injurious materials. It is
the in-between area of probable injury that is most difficult to determine and
yet which must be determined.
To know what the effect of exposing a group's secrets will be, to realize
how seriously a person's reputation may be damaged, and to visualize the
effects of violation of privacy presupposes knowledge on the part of the scientist
which he may not have. This knowledge can be approached to the extent to
which the scientist saturates himself in the social relations of the group which
he studies. It probably cannot be achieved by the aloof scientist who simply
culls the reports of those who have done the actual and basic data collecting.
Since there is a great difference between imaginary and objective derogation of reputation, the sociologist may tend to brush off the former as relevant
and uncontrollable. Human decency, however, would seem to require that the
scientist make an effort to inquire even into this possibility of psychological and
subjective injury. The scientist cannot guard against all such contingencies and
against the unexpected and unwarranted complaints of people, but he should
do his human best to avoid them ahead of time and to be sympathetic to them
if they come.
If the sociologist attempts to interpret the social behavior of the people he
studies, he must assess the responsibility of the people for their own actions.
False sentimentality must not result in the denial of the fact that a person must
accept the consequences of the acts for which he is responsible. The scientist
cannot erase the responsibilities, duties, and obligations, of the objects of his
study. Yet, at the same time, he must recognize that the human being is never
completely responsible for his actions, and that in many cases factors over
which the person or group has no control may come close to completely determining certain acts. Since the assessment of responsibility will be contained in
the research report, injury can be done if the assessment is not carefully made.
3. The degree to which people or groups are actually members of a moral
community of which the scientist is also a member. At the core of the Western
value system is a belief in the basic dignity and worth of the human being. This
belief is based on different assumptions according to the particular stream of
tradition in which one locates it: the Fatherhood of God, natural law, universal
human needs and aspirations, or human reason. Whatever the base, the belief
implies that men are bound to one another in a moral community. Membership
in this community requires that the individual's rights to privacy, secrecy, and
reputation be respected, even though the human beings studied may not be
members of the sociologist's own society.
The belief also implies that a man or group can renounce membership in the
moral community by choosing modes of action which violate these basic values
of dignity and worth. In mid-century it seems probable that men like Hitler and
Stalin, organized groups like "Murder Incorporated," the Ku Klux Klan, and
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some others, have placed themselves outside the moral community and have
surrendered the protection of its norms. Thus the social scientist need have no
qualms about reporting in full detail the activities of such groups and people.
Although this norm has never been explicitly formulated, it has guided a great
deal of the research and reporting in social science.
Yet the decision of the sociologist to place particular persons or groups
outside the moral community involves great responsibility, and he must be
careful that his criteria of judgment permit tolerance, compassion, and wisdom.
This is especially the case when he studies "unpopular" racial, religious and
political groups, prostitutes, homosexuals, drug addicts, and the psychologically ill, the poor and powerless. It is hardly questionable that these people
remain members of the moral community and hence retain their rights of privacy, respect, and secrecy. The needs of the society may require a limitation
of their rights by the courts or by the social scientist in his reporting, but basic
rights can be limited only to the extent that they must be limited. Beyond that
point such people must be treated in the same way as other members of the
moral community.
The recognition of basic human rights which accompany membership in the
moral community is an important means by which social scientists can avoid the
dangers of the use of purely subjective criteria. Within the consensus of the
Western tradition it is objectively true that there are moral evils and modes of
action which place the perpetrator outside this community. We must know as
much as possible about such people and the scientist need have little inhibition
in the report he provides about them. All other persons and groups, no matter
how personally distasteful to the scientist, seem to require the respect of their
fellow-members in the moral community.
4. The degree to which the larger society, the local community, or the
group, needs the data of the research. Real urgency must be defined in terms
of the pressing needs of a group, community, or society, or in terms of some
impending problem of which the scientist but not the group or community being
studied is aware. Rights and duties are never qualified in society and one of the
qualifications seems to be that the society sometimes has a prior right to information which is necessary and useful for itself even though it may be harmful
to an individual or sub-group.
The social scientist may find himself in one of several moral situations
when he is trying to determine whether or not the social need is greater than the
individual or group right. If the duly appointed authorities of a community or
of the larger society believe certain information to be vitally needed, there is a
prima facie case for the scientist to reveal such information . However, these
authorities must show to the scientist the ground for the need. If he does not
know and cannot find out from the authorities whether there is an urgent need
for certain data which will be harmful to individuals and sub-groups, he is free
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of moral obligation to reveal it. If he is certain that the information is not
necessary, he may in good conscience refuse to reveal it even though the
authorities demand to know it. It must be recognized that his freedom in such
instances is moral and not legal, and he may have to pay a price for his refusal.
In a similar manner the obligations which the scientist has to the group
studied may require the revelation of information damaging to individuals or
sub-groups. In this instance the scientist himself is likely to be the best judge
of the need for his data. If he understands and accepts the basic values of the
group and takes his obligation to the group seriously, he may find it imperative
to disclose such information. Since he cannot plead ignorance, and since there
is no demand from competent higher authority, the responsibility for the assessment of urgency rests squarely on the scientist.
Finally, even though neither the higher authority nor the representatives of
the group studied place any demands upon him, he may become aware of facts
which are vitally needed by the social group studied or by the society. In such
cases he must not only accept the responsibility for violating the rights of
individuals and groups, but also must arrive at his decision with very little
outside aid. In clear-cut instances where the comparison and balancing of the
rights of the various claimants can be easily accomplished, the decision may
be easily reached. But it is certainly in this area that the researcher will be forced
to consider most thoroughly the importance which he, himself, has placed on
the value of the information in its relation to the needs of the group.
The complexities exhibited in the discussion of the four central variables
indicate that the problem of ethical limitations on sociological reporting cannot
be reduced to a simple either-or proposition of a conflict between the scientific
objectivity of a research report and the ethical inhibitions of the person who
writes the report. It is apparent that the sociologist must act simultaneously
according to a highly developed procedural code for scientific reporting and a
code of ethics based on the belief that the objects of his study are also subjects.
These codes are not irreconcilable, but the resolution of specific conflicts between them may be a very complex task, involving the claims of many groups
and the interrelationships of the four variables. Yet the sociologist must resolve
them. If there is a tendency for the sociologist to become more scientific, he
must also become increasingly sensitized to the rights, feelings, and needs of
the people he studies. Treating them as subjects means that to the best of his
ability he will treat them with justice, understanding, compassion, and, in the
last analysis, love.

